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Abstract
O Freedom of Information Act americano é gratuito até um nú-
mero governo decidiu de páginas, mas as informações dadas está sujeita 
à censura desnecessária. Como essa supressão se relaciona com o Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, assumimos que grande parte desse controle de 
informações deve a sua existência a uma regra em casa, seja de facto ou 
de jure, que restringe qualquer coisa que mesmo parece que pode voltar 
a assombrar a agência. O suporte é fornecido por documentos liberados 
pelo FBI contrastados com os mesmos documentos disponibilizados a 
partir dos serviços de segurança do Canadá.
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While conducting the research for “Johnny Project,”3 in Janu-
ary 1995, the American Federal Bureau of Investigation was contacted 
when it was learned that they might have a 2le on Johann Heinrich 
Amadeus de Graaf, commonly known, among 69 other names, as Jo-
hnny de Graaf.4 Indeed, the FBI did have such an archive, and we were 
instructed to initiate a request to the U.S. Department of Justice, Free-
dom of Information Action section to have the appropriate documents 
released.5 5is article serves as a warning to those planning to use the 
seemingly open archive policy of the United States, 2rst made available 
in 1966 when the act became law during the presidency of Lyndon B. 
Johnson.6 In theory, anyone, foreign or domestic, can request informa-
tion under the statute. For academicians, it gave then and still gives 
now the impression of a largely untapped reserve of information. Such 
things, however, are never exactly what they seem.
De Graaf led a life worthy of a Hollywood movie: World 
3 The published version is available in English in as Johnny: A Spy’s Life (College Park: 
Penn State University Press, 2010) and in Portuguese as Johnny: A vida do espião que 
delatou a Rebelião Comunista no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2010).
4 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation [hereafter FBI], [J. Kevin 
O’Brien], letter, August 18, 1995. At the time, O’Brien was the chief of the Freedom of 
Information Privacy Acts Information Resources Division.
5 Ibid., letters, January 24, 1995 and August 3, 1995.
6 Johnson was opposed to the bill for much of its ride through the legislature. He 
begrudgingly signed it, on July 4th, following a good deal of cajoling by California 
Democratic congressman John Moss. LBJ’s resistance revolved around his dislike 
of allowing outsiders to scrutinize government archives. In the end, he affixed his 
signature to the measure with an accompanying statement cautioning against releas-
ing military secrets, confidential advice, personnel files, investigative files and those 
items withheld out of executive privilege. “Freedom of Information at 40,” The Na-
tional Security Archive, [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/index.
htm], accessed August 12, 2012. 
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War I hero in the German navy, the Kaiserliche Marine, condemned 
to death for sedition, agitator and member of the German Commu-
nist Party, involved in the murder of Horst Wessel, educated in Mos-
cow, M4 (Soviet Military Intelligence) o8cer, Communist operative 
on four continents, double agent up to and during World War II. 
5e Soviets thought he was one of theirs, but since 1933, he actually 
worked for England’s MI6. Nearly singlehandedly, he kept Brazil 
from going Communist in 1935. He travelled to Canada twice and 
assisted the Royal Canadian Mounted Police through much of the 
war to unmask local Nazis and Communists. He was the 2rst to 
inform London of the location of the pocket battleship, Graf Spee.
As with other requests by other researchers, a Department of 
Justice/FBI stipulation was included with their initial response that 
some items might be restricted owing to various legal provisions of 
the Act. 5e Americans never used the word censorship, conceivably 
due to the feeling that such terminology was reserved for accusing 
other, less democratic nations of this or that transgression. Instead, 
the preferred synonym employed by Washington, DC was “redac-
ted,” a word that many would have to look up to comprehend.7 It was 
likewise pointed out that there was a backlog of cases in July 1995. 
5ey had received 14,450 requests requiring at least 5.2 years to be 
reviewed before their potential release.8 5ese last two sentences, of 
course, translated into the American’s way to say that their review 
process could take considerable time, if ever, to complete.
7 The term is perhaps only exceeded in its hilarity by another U.S. government phrase, 
“expletive deleted.”
8 J. Kevin O’Brien], letter, August 18, 1995.
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5e next communication from the FBI was nearly 18 months 
later when they wished to know if the release of documents were still 
desired. A response within 30 days was required or the request would 
be “administratively” dropped.9 A reply to the FBI con2rmed that 
the documents were still desired, however, the FBI, for its part nearly 
a year later, could still not give a date or even an estimation of when 
the requested material might be available.10
On November 27, 2000, nearly six years after the initial com-
munication to them, a partial liberation was made of the total number 
of releasable documents. 5e total number of items reviewed totaled 
475 pages, of which 400 were made available. Possibly, the censored 75 
pages consisted in a number of duplicates, but this could not be con2r-
med owing to the FBI’s failure to report such information.11 Among the 
released pages, however, numerous names, sentences, and paragraphs 
were blacked out. Initially, the Department of Justice’s Freedom of In-
formation Act functionaries xeroxed the original document, and then 
censored the too sensitive sections with a thick Pentel before reprodu-
cing the copy. 5e copy of the copy was then sent to the requester.
5e suppressed sections were deleted from release owing to 
Title 5 of the United States Code, Section 552 (Freedom of Infor-
mation Act), Subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(7)(C), and (b)(7)(D). Sub-
section (b)(1) withholds information that is deemed to be “(A) spe-
9 Ibid., letter, February 14, 1997.
10 Ibid., letters, January 9, 1998.
11  FBI, John M. Kolar [family name partially illegible], letter, June 13, 2001 [hereafter, 
Kolar letter]. Kolar’s official title was the chief of the Freedom of Information Acts Sec-
tion Office of Public and Congressional Affairs.
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ci2cally authorized under criteria established by an executive order 
to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign policy 
and (B) are in fact properly classi2ed pursuant to such executive or-
der.” Subsection (b)(2) removes from release items “related solely to 
the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” Note that 
this latter subsection would conceivably allow functionaries to censor 
anything they so wished without fear of reprisal.
Subsections (b)(7)(C) deletes from public scrutiny items that 
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy.” Subsection (b)(7)(D) censorsmaterial that “could 
reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a con2dential sour-
ce, including a state, local, or foreign agency or authority of any pri-
vate institution which furnished information on a con2dential basis, 
and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law 
enforcement authority in the course of criminal investigation, or by 
an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investi-
gation, information furnished by a con2dential source.”12
On June 13, 2001, another 244 out of 294 reviewed pages 
were made available.13 Following an appeal process, a further 75 pa-
ges were released.14 5is brought the total number of pages forwarded 
12 FBI, “FBI Records: Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act,” <http://www.fbi.gov/
foia/foia-exemptions>, accessed February 4, 2012.
13 Kolar letter.
14 R.S. Rose to Co-Director [Richard L. Huff], U.S. Department of Justice [hereafter 
USDJ], June 19, 2001; U.S. Department of State, [Margaret P. Grafeld], letter, August 
7, 2001; USDJ, [Richard L. Huff], letters, October 1, 2001; and July 29, 2004. At 
the time of her communication, Grafeld was the director of the IRM Programs and 
Services at the Department of State. Huff was the co-director of the Department of 
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to this researcher on De Graaf to 719.
Having read the available literature on Johnny de Graaf, and 
having interviewed several persons from his family, this author was 
familiar with many of the events with which he had been involved. 
5e FBI and other U.S. Government documents released thus con-
tained many censored names that the author knew were blacked out, 
but should not have been so treated. Early in the process, it was ex-
plained that the rule used to release a name was based on three crite-
ria: 1) obtaining permission from that individual, 2) showing that a 
person was diseased, or 3) proving that the person was over 100 years 
of age, and thus could reasonably assume to be diseased.
In order to prove that someone had passed away, on the other 
hand, the burden was placed squarely on the shoulders of the re-
quester. U.S. government’s functionaries would not lift a 2nger to 
search for someone on the internet—even when the internet source 
was provided con2rming a death. All they had to do was click on the 
cyberspace address to check. Proof of death or age of 100+ had to be 
provided at the time of the original FOIA request. American bureau-
crats accepted death certi2cates, newspaper articles about someone’s 
demise, or other documental sources attesting to a death or advanced 
age—at that time only.15 5is would conceivably mean that if an ap-
plicant suspected the identity of a censored name in already released 
material, he or she would have to reapply with written proof of an 
individual’s death, not an internet address to that proof, then wait 
Justice, Office of Information and Privacy.
15 USDJ, [Richard L. Huff], letter, March 7, 2005.
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years and pay the copying fees once again. Moreover, the applicant 
would have to repurchase the entire 2le and not just single pages in 
the 2le.16 5rough this clever and expensive process, the number of 
researchers who reapply was/is obviously reduced.
5roughout the appeal process, moreover, government o8-
cials continued to use the same opening phraseology made infamous 
by the American auto insurance industry when denying a claim: “Af-
ter careful consideration [italics mine] of this matter, I have determi-
ned that my original decision, . . . was appropriate.”17
There was no “careful consideration.” In fact there was prob-
ably no consideration of any kind. What happened and continues to 
happen was and is a circling of American government wagons. This 
fact was borne out by two facts. First, the vast majority of names in 
 !"#$"%"&'"(#()*+,"- '#'"- # )# !.'#$"'"&$*!"$#/"$"#"01+-2"(3#4!.'#
could lead one to believe that the persons who did the censoring sim-
ply covered up any name they ran across. As bureaucrats, they must 
have reasoned, “Why stick my neck out? It might come back to haunt 
me. So I’ll just delete everything that looks interesting, relevant, 
or that I don’t understand.” Second, and most revealing, De Graaf 
16 USDJ, [David M. Hardy], letter, May 27, 2005. At the time of his communication, 
Hardy was the U.S.
Department of Justice’s section chief, Record/Information Dissemination Section, Re-
cords Management Division. A list of 91-released pages with suspected erroneously 
censured names was prepared and sent to the Department of Justice. They indicated 
that a new request to see the entire file would have to be made. USDJ, [Richard L. 
Huff], letter, March 7, 2005.
17 USDJ, [Richard L. Huff], letters, September 29, 2004; March 7, 2005; and USDJ, 
[David M. Hardy], letter, May 10, 2006 [postmarked].
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agreed to a series of FBI interrogations, that began in Montreal on 
5&$*!#678#69:;3#<)!--=#!&(#>%"(# !"#1&1"$/)$?# )#@"*),"#&#A&-&(.-
an citizen three days before the arrival of the FBI agents in “La belle 
ville.”18 As a condition for those interviews to take place, the RCMP 
supervised the meeting and received a typed, uncensored copy of the 
101-page question and answer session. While the released FBI mate-
rial had a version of this document, complete with censored names, 
the Canadian version, later released to the author, did not. Comparing 
the two accountings produced a total of 51 “redacted” names, some 
appearing more than once on the 101-page FBI copy.
Name deleted at least once on each FBI 
page
U.S.
censoring
statute
Page 
number,
FBI copy
Page
number,
RCMP 
copy
(vol. 4)
Aitken, George (b)(7)(C) 39 42
Aitken, George (b)(7)(C) 40 44
Aitken, George (b)(7)(C) 42 46
Aitken, George (b)(7)(C) 44 47
Aitken, George (b)(7)(C) 45 48
Aitken, George (b)(7)(C) 45 49
Berger, Harry19 (b)(7)(C) 55 60
Billy (b)(7)(C) 39 42
Billy (b)(7)(C) 40 43
Billy (b)(7)(C) 42 46
18 Canada, document, “Petition for a Certificate of Canadian Citizenship by a British 
Subject,” John Henry de Graff [petitioner], March 7, 1952, p. 2.
19 Harry Berger, one of the aliases of Arthur Ernst Ewert, was on the list of names 
originally provided to FBI bureaucrats, with proof of his death.
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Brandler, Heinrich (b)(7)(C) 9 8
Brandler, Heinrich (b)(7)(C) 10 9
Bunzlau, Josef (b)(7)(C) 88 95
Bunzlau, Josef (b)(7)(C) 89 96
Cachin, Marcel (b)(7)(C) 44 48
Cachin, Marcel (b)(7)(C) 53 57
Dunker, Herman 17 17
Feix (b)(7)(C) 71 77
Fischer, Ruth (b)(7)(C) 9 8
Fischer, Ruth (b)(7)(C) 10 8
Fischer, Ruth (b)(7)(C) 11 10
Fischer, Ruth (b)(7)(C) 11 11
Fischer, Ruth (b)(7)(C) 12 11
Florin, Wilhelm (b)(7)(C) 16 16
Frohlich, Paul (b)(7)(C) 17 17
General Blucher [a.k.a Galem] (b)(7)(C) 32 34
Gobbels, Jacob (b)(7)(C) 48 52
Gobbels, Jacob (b)(7)(C) 49 53
Gobbels, Jacob (b)(7)(C) 52 56
Goldie (b)(7)(C) 71 78
Hans (b)(7)(C) 85 92
Harry [Hans Wilhelm] (b)(7)(C) 85 92
Harry [Hans Wilhelm] (b)(7)(C) 86 93
Harry [Hans Wilhelm] (b)(7)(C) 89 96
Harry [Hans Wilhelm] (b)(7)(C) 90 97
Harry [Hans Wilhelm] (b)(7)(C) 92 99
Heckert, Fritz (b)(7)(C) 46 50
Heckert, Fritz (b)(7)(C) 47 50
Heckert, Fritz (b)(7)(C) 47 51
Horstman, Dr. (b)(7)(C) 18 18
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Julien, Francisco (b)(7)(C) 89 96
Junescu (b)(7)(C) 34 37
Junescu (b)(7)(C) 36 38
Kaganovich, Lavar (b)(7)(C) 80 87
Kaganovich, Lavar (b)(7)(C) 81 88
Kruerberg (b)(7)(C) 12 12
Kuusinen, Otto (b)(7)(C) 28 31
Ladislaw (b)(7)(C) 56 61
Ladislaw (b)(7)(C) 58 63
Lebowitsch [Leibovitch] (b)(7)(C) 19 19
Lebowitsch [Leibovitch] (b)(7)(C) 43 47
Losafsky (b)(7)(C) 44 48
Manuilski, Dmitri (b)(7)(C) 38 41
Manuilski, Dmitri (b)(7)(C) 44 48
Manuilski, Dmitri (b)(7)(C) 45 49
Manuilski, Dmitri (b)(7)(C) 46 50
Manuilski, Dmitri (b)(7)(C) 62 67
Manuilski, Dmitri (b)(7)(C) 62 68
Manuilski, Dmitri (b)(7)(C) 63 68
Manuilski, Dmitri (b)(7)(C) 75 82
Manuilski, Dmitri (b)(7)(C) 76 82
Manuilski, Dmitri (b)(7)(C) 76 82
Maria (b)(7)(C) 91 98
Marti (b)(7)(C) 44 48
Marti (b)(7)(C) 44 48
Max (b)(7)(C) 80 87
Mello, Dr. [Dr. Barbosa de Mello Ilvo 
Meireles]
(b)(7)(C) 64 69
Mikoyan, Anastas (b)(7)(C) 80 87
Milly (b)(7)(C) 39 42
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Milly (b)(7)(C) 40 43
Milly (b)(7)(C) 42 46
Milly (b)(7)(C) 43 46
Milton [Eugene Dennis] (b)(7)(C) 56 60
Milton [Eugene Dennis] (b)(7)(C) 60 65
Milton [Eugene Dennis] (b)(7)(C) 60 66
Milton [Eugene Dennis] (b)(7)(C) 61 66
Milton [Eugene Dennis] (b)(7)(C) 62 67
Molotov, Vyacheslav (b)(7)(C) 80 87
Molotov, Vyacheslav (b)(7)(C) 81 88
Munzenberg (b)(7)(C) 14 13
Obuch, Dr. (b)(7)(C) 18 18
Paulina (b)(7)(C) 34 37
Pieck, William (b)(7)(C) 9 8
Pieck, William (b)(7)(C) 10 10
Pieck, William (b)(7)(C) 18 19
Pieck, William (b)(7)(C) 19 19
Plantz, Special Agent (b)(7)(C) 23 25
Pollitt, Harry (b)(7)(C) 38 41
Pollitt, Harry (b)(7)(C) 40 43
Pollitt, Harry (b)(7)(C) 41 44
Pollitt, Harry (b)(7)(C) 41 45
Pollitt, Harry (b)(7)(C) 42 45
Pollitt, Harry (b)(7)(C) 42 46
Pollitt, Harry (b)(7)(C) 44 47
Pollitt, Harry (b)(7)(C) 45 48
Pollitt, Harry (b)(7)(C) 45 49
Saul (b)(7)(C) 34 37
Saul (b)(7)(C) 35 38
Silverthorn, Special Agent (b)(7)(C) 23 25
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Stolzenberg (b)(7)(C) 11 11
Swan, Willie (b)(7)(C) 9 8
Swan, Willie (b)(7)(C) 10 9
Swan, Willie (b)(7)(C) 11 10
Swan, Willie (b)(7)(C) 11 11
5alheimer, August (b)(7)(C) 9 8
5alheimer, August (b)(7)(C) 10 9
Ulbricht, Walter (b)(7)(C) 9 8
Ulbricht, Walter (b)(7)(C) 10 10
Ulbricht, Walter (b)(7)(C) 18 19
Ulbricht, Walter (b)(7)(C) 51 55
Voroshilov, General Klimientiy (b)(7)(C) 31 34
Walter, Mrs. (b)(7)(C) 59 64
Wickman, Harry (b)(7)(C) 55 59
Wickman, Harry (b)(7)(C) 55 60
Wickman, Harry (b)(7)(C) 57 62
Wilhelm, Hans (b)(7)(C) 52 56
Wilhelm, Hans (b)(7)(C) 60 65
Wilhelm, Hans (b)(7)(C) 62 67
Wollenberger (b)(7)(C) 42 45
Using simple ratio and proportion, in the 719 released pages, 
some 363 names were considered too dangerous for the public to see 
.-#()*+,"- '#&'#)%(#&'#B7#="&$'3#C.' +$@.-2#&'# !.'#.'8#*&-#/"#"01"* #
that there are names that any college-educated Department of Jus-
tice/FBI civil servant should have known as belonging to persons 
who had died—and thus were releasable? Counted here were:
Heinrich Brandler
Ruth Fischer
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Lavar Kaganovich
Otto Kuusinen
Dmitri Manuilski
Anastas Mikoyan
Vyacheslav Molotov
William Pieck
Harry Pollitt
August 5alheimer
Walter Ulbricht
General Klimientiy Voroshilov
Indeed, can we presume that the functionaries of the U.S. 
Department of Justice and FBI have ever taken an introductory cour-
se in 20th Century English, German, or Russian history during their 
college careers? How can the release of such identities be constituted 
to be, according to subsection (b)(7)(C), “an unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy” if the person is deceased? Is this not one of the 
criteria mentioned as a reason for releasing someone’s name in the 
2rst place? If the onus of providing names of deceased person when 
2rst applying falls on the applicant, why then does the Department 
of Justice/FBI even need people to respond to their Freedom of In-
formation Act applications? Could not a machine do the job just as 
well if not better than a human?
Certainly, the supervisors of such public servants are selected 
because they have at least a master’s degree and/or have lived through 
the times at the Bureau when communism was enemy number one. 
Should they, if anyone, know that all of the above short-listed indivi-
176 | InterAção 
duals are dead? It is reasonable to believe that they should, but do not 
because of faulty selection procedures by the American Department 
of Justice and FBI in allocating supervising employees to the roles of 
Freedom of Information Act overseers. Moreover, to say that “after 
careful consideration” these superiors deem that their underlings have 
acted correctly in repressing a name is probably a falsehood. While 
some superiors actually read the requests and appeals that cross their 
desks, a more likely scenario is that the majority of superiors simply 
sign oX without ever reading beyond the recommendations of under-
lings.
5ere is one 2nal alternative.  Could it be that the American 
government, in it labyrinth of competing security agencies, allows its 
records of who was on or is on the political left to inYuence what and 
how much material is released to the petitioner under the terms of the 
Freedom of Information Act?  While we would hope that such is not 
the case, it is not beyond the realm of possibility in view of the ite-
ms withheld in this study on Johnny de Graaf.  Contributors might, 
accordingly, wish to think carefully about their own past, including 
their ties to Latin America, before requesting documents from the 
U.S. Department of Justice/FBI.  It is vital to note, in this regard, 
that the selective availability of archival items impacts what we know 
and do not know about the past.  In that vein, the forces controlling 
access to this information shape our collective memories and in so 
doing manipulate our history—not just in Latin America, but so too 
in the United States of America.
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